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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 








STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant was convicted of Second Degree 
Burglary in violation of 76-9-3 UCA 1953, in the 
First Judicial District Court, Cache County, and 
appeals from the conviction. Case was heard Novem-
ber 29, 1966, the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, Sixth 
Judicial District, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried on November 29, 1966, 
on the crime of Second Degree Burglary. The case 
was tried to the court without a jury, the Honorable 
Ferdinand Erickson presiding. Defendant and appell-
ant was found guilty, and judgment entered thereon on 
the 4th day of January, 1967. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appe 1 l ant he rein seeks a reversal of the j udg. ~~ 
ment of the lower court as a matter of law and a 
d . . 1 f h · At 1sm1ssa o t 1s action by this Court; or, failing Di 
that, that the defendant and appellant herein be 
d a~ grante a new trial to be heard without prejudicial (l 
error to the appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1' 
In the late evening hours of March 3, 1966, or 
5 
the early morning hours of March 4, 1966, the Hyrum p 
Drug Store located at 60 West Main Street, Hyrum, a 
Utah, was entered and a quantity of narcotics were t 
taken from the store (T 8, 13). At approximately 4 
6:15 A.M., of the 4th day of March, 1966, an auto- 1 
mobile was observed by Iver L. Larsen on First North 
Street, Hyrum, Utah, behind the Hyrum Drug Store. 
Mr. Larsen noted the 1 icense number of the car and 
observed a man sitting by himself in the automobile. 
(T 42-46). About three hours later the burglary was 
discovered by the store owner and reported to Sheriff 
Wesley G. Malmberg, Sheriff of Cache County. Mr. 
Larsen then gave to Sheriff Malmberg the information 
concerning the 1 icense plate and description of the I 
car he observed. (T 4 3) . The 1 i cense number be 1 on gel 
to a car registered to Mr. E. G. Hunt of South Ogden, 
Utah. (T 107). 
Sheriff Malmberg went to the home of Mr. E. G. ' 
Hunt, where he found Mr. Dennis Hunt. Mr. Dennis 
Hunt after questioning, delivered to Sheriff Malmberg\ 
a crowbar, designated as Ex. 1, together with a j 
quantity of drugs and bottles, designated as Ex. 3 - II 
11) (T. 107, 1 08, 122) • This evidence of the burg-
1 ary which was received by Sheriff Malmberg was all 
the physical evidence submitted to the trial cou~t. 
Al 1 physical evidence connecting the appellant with 
the burglary in any fashion was delivered to the 
Sheriff by Mr. Dennis Hunt. (T 123, 124). 
3 
At the time of tria1 the State's witnesses in-
clud ,d Mr. Dennis Hunt and Miss Mary Jones both of 
lg. wh0'11 had previous 1 y been told by the Cache' County 
Attorney and the District Attorney for the First 
ng District that if they would testify against the 
appellant they wou1d not be prosecuted by the State. 
al (T 96). 
According to the testimony of Dennis Hunt and 
Mary Jones, they went to Logan, Utah, on March 3, 
1966, and contacted the appellant (T 51). After 
1r spending so~etime with the a?pe1lant a group of five 
m people, including Mr. Hunt, Miss Jones, and the 
appellant, drove to Pocatello, Idaho, (T 53) where 
they remained unti1 the early morning hours of March 
4, 1966, and then returned to Logan, Utah, (T 53). 
They went to a cafe in Logan, (T 53). They then, 
:h according to Mr. Hunt's testimony, drove to the 
a?pel1ant 1s home where a crowbar was obtained. (T 54). 
They, Mr. Hunt, Miss Jones, Mr. Nielson, and Appel-
lant, then drove to Mr. Nielson's car, in Mr. Hunt's 
s car. (T 55). The two auto~obiles were then driven 
ff to the Town of Hyrum, Utah. (T 55). Mr. Hunt, Miss 
Jones, Mr. Nie1son and the appe11ant got into Mr. 
Hunt's car and drove around the Hyrum area for so.~e 
I period of time. (T 55, 57). Mr. Nie1so'1 and the 
1el appe11ant a11eged1y 1eft the Hunt car with a crowbar 
1, a'1d a bag, wh i 1 e the car was parked on the street 
I behind the Hyrum Drug Store. (T 58, 60). Miss Jones stated that she and Mr. Hunt waited for awhile, then 
drove around the town of Hyrum for a period of time 
and then returned to park near the store. (T 130). d She a1so testified that she heard scraping and 
I screeching noises coming from the direction of the 
j store, and that a short time later Mr. Nie1son and 
1 the appe11ant returned to the car. Miss Jones then 
opened the car door for them. (T 158). 
Miss Jones testified that there was discussion 
in her presence as to the fact that a 11job11 or un1aw-
ful break-in was going to take place. She said, how-
ever, that she did not know where unti1 they had 
6 
and the appellant. Mr. Hunt dropped Mr. Nielson 
and the appellant off at Mr. Nielson's car, and 
after the group separated they reconvened at Miss 
Jones' apartment in Ogden, Utah. While driving to 
Ogden with Miss Jones, Mr. Hunt once again made no co 
effort to notify the pol ice. He spent twenty-four 
hours at Miss Jones' apartment where al 1 four used 
the stolen drugs. After returning to his parents 1 st 
home some thirty hours after the burglary, Mro Hunt Mi 
was informed that the Cache County Sheri ff was look- he 
ing for him. Then, and only then did he cal 1 the tr 
authorities. 
At the time of trial, Mr. Hunt said he was an bL 
informer for the F. B. I . attempting to 1 ocate stolen n< 
cars. The general law provides that an informer 
L 
IC 
who has no intent to commit a crime is not an accom· a~ 
pl ice. Shepherd v. U.S. (1908 CCA 8th) 160 F 584, cE 
cert. denied 212 U. S. 571. However a person is an .)L 
accomplice unless his~ intent (emphasis added) 
when he participates in the act is to secure the 
apprehension of the other participants. Under no 
circumstances may he intend to share in the proceeds al 
of the burglary. Wi Ison v. People, 103 Colo. 44; p< 
87 p 2d 5. t( 
Where the evidence is not clear it is for the 
trier of the fact to determine whether a witness is 
a real or feigned accomplice within the general 
doctrine stated above. People v. Bunker (1905) 
2 Cal App 197, 84 P 36, Porter v. People, 31 Colo 
508, 74 P 879, State v. Smith, 33 Nev 438, 117 P 19, 
In this case the trial court did not rule as to 
whether the witness Mr. Hunt, was or was not an 
accomplice whose testimony would require corrobora-
tion. The record clearly indicates that Mr. Hunt 
by his own testimony was an accomplice because of 
his participation not only in the planning of the 
burglary but in the execution thereof, together with 











PO INT 11. 
STATE'S WITNESS MARY JONES IS AN ACCOMPLICE, AS 
A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT, WHOSE TESTIMONY REQUIRES 
cORROBORAT I ON. 
Mary Jones, witness for the State, was in con-
itant association with the appel I ant, Dennis Hunt and 
t Mike Nielson for a period of approximately fifteen 
k· hours prior to the alleged burglary and thirty hours 
thereafter. (R-125, 159). 
By her own testimony she knew of the plan to 
burglarize a drug store, (T 154 L 18-26) and that 
narcotic pi 1 ls were the intended object of the crime. 
She waited while the burglary took place, and encour-
1. aged the crime by her presence and apparent acquies-
cence. She acted as a lookout, picked up the alleged 
)urg 1 ars, and even opened the door of the car to 
facilitate their get-away. 
The conduct of Miss Jones is sufficiently culp-
5 able to have successfully prosecuted her as a princi-
pal, since she had knowledge that a crime was going 
to be committed; knew what was going to be burglarized; 
acted as a lookout during the al Jeged crime; ·assisted 
in the parties' fleeing from the scene, and used the 
drugs taken in the a1 leged crime, at her apartment. 
There are numerous cases which hold that the 
question of whether a person is an accomplice is 
determined by the evidence showing the accomplice's 
participation in a crime. Illustrative of these 
cases a re: 
People v. Swoape, (1925) 75 Cal. App. 404, 242 P 
1067. In this case the State's witness was held to be 
accomplice on his testimony that he knew the pipe was 
being stolen and assisted in loading it on the truck 
that carried it away. 
8 
Commonwealth v. Coyle, 203 A. 2d 782 (1964), 
In this case the defendant, John Coy 1 e, was convi c· 
ted by a jury of first degree murder. The facts as 
established by the evidence incident to the killing 
showed that defendant and his brother W i 11 i am armed 
themselves with revolvers and went out in a Phi lade]. 
phia neighborhood to steal milk before dawn on Ju~ 
5, 1959. While John was standing watch, Wi 11 iam was 
steal i ng mi l k from a front porch when pol ice off i ceri 
caughi him in the act. Shots were fired and the 
pol ice officer fell dead. Although the evidence was 
in conflict as to who was the actual killer, the 
trial court held and Pennsylvania Supreme Court af-
firmed that both we re equa 1 l y gu i 1 ty; and John, even 
if he did not fire the fatal shots, was a principal 
in the second degree and was subject to the same 
punishment as if he were the principal felon. 
At page 786, quoting from Commonwealth v. Lowry. 
98 A 2d 773 (1953) and Weston v. Commonweal th, 2 A 
191 (1885), the court said: 
11 lt is not necessary, however, to prove 
that the party actually aided in the commis-
sion of the offense; if he watched for his 
companions, in order to prevent surprise, 
or remained at a convenient distance in order 
to favor their escape, if necessary, or was 
in such a situation as to be able readily to 
come to their assistance, the knowledge of 
whi~h was calculated to give additional con-
fidence to his companions in contemplation 
of 1 aw , he was a i d i n g and ab e tt i n g • r 1 
People v. Ortiz, 25 Cal Rptr 327 (1962) •. Here 
defendant was convicted of possession of heroin al-
though the direct evidence showed that his wife, 
rather than he, was in actual possession of the drug 
at the time of arrest. 
Affirming the trial court's conviction, the 
California District Court of Appeal said at Page 333: 
9 
110 h . new o 1s present and is aware of the 
acts of the perpetrator of the crime and 
either by acts or encouragement or warning 
or by gestures aids or encourages the commis-
sion of the crime is an aider and abettor and 
may be charged as a principal ,11 
People v. Marx, 125 N.E. 719 (1920), where de-
fendant was convicted of rape, and on appea 1 it was 
argued, among other things, that he was not guilty 
since he had not had sexual intercourse with the 
prosecutrix or taken any active part with others who 
had intercourse. In affirming the conviction the 
11 l inois Supreme Court said at page 722: 
11 Notw i ths tand i ng these rules as to non-
1 iabi l ity of a passive spectator, it is cer-
tain that proof that a person is present at 
the commission of a crime without disapprov-
ing or opposing it is evidence from which rn 
connection with other circumstances it is 
competent for the jury to infer that he 
assented thereto, lent to it his countenance 
and approval, and was thereby aiding and 
abetting the same. 11 
Cotton v. State, 211 N.E. 2d 158 (1965), In 
this case the defendant was convicted of grand lar-
ceny and burglary by Marion County Criminal Court, 
The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the conviction, 
Citing Mobley v. State, 85 N,E, 2d 489 (1949) 
and Mattingly v. State, 104 N.E. 2d 721 (1952) the 
court said at page 161: 
riEven if there were no active participa-
tion in the commission of the crime failure 
to oppose it at the time, companionship with 
others engaged therein, and a course of con-
duct before and after the offense are such 
circumstances as may be considered in deter-
mining whether aiding or abetting may be in-
ferred.11 
10 
The 1 aw does not make a bystander or spectator 
to a criminal act a participant if he is only a 
spectator and does not act to countenance or appr~ 
those who are actors. Hicks v. U.S., 150 u. s. e 
442, 376 Ed. 1137, 14 S. Ct. 144. However, a per· 
son ceases to be a bystander or spectator when he 
encourages its commission by acts, or gestures, 
either before or at the time of the commission of 
the offense, with full knowledge of the intent of 
the persons who commit the offense. Peop 1 e v. Mar.:i_ 
Supra, 722. 
The question to be determined in ascertaining 
whether a person is in a position to aid and abet 
in the comm is s ion of an offense is not so much where 
he may happen to be, as whether he is in a position 
to render aid and encouragement to the actual per-
petrator, with a view of insuring the success of the 
common purpose. Cavert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531, 14 
s .w. 2d 735. 
A principal has been defined to include a per· 
son who was present at the time a crime was committee 
1 ending countenance, aid, or encouragement, or keep· 
ing watch at some convenient distance while anoth~r 
did the actual criminal act. Dooley v. Coleman, 
126 Fla. 203, 170 So. 722. 
Thus Mary Jones by her conduct both overt and 
tacitly became in fact and as a matter of law, an 
accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated. 
PO INT 111 
THAT THE STATE'S WITNESSES MARY JONES AND DENNIS 
HUNT WERE IN FACT AND IN LAW ACCOMPLICES AND THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO CORROBORATE THEIR 
TESTIMONY. 
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-31-18 pro· 
vides as follows: 
11 
"Conviction on Testimony of Accomplice -
A conviction shall not be had on the testi-
mony of an accomplice, unless he is corro-
borated by other evidence, which in itself 
and without the aid of the testimony of the 
accomplice tends to connect the defendant 
with the commission of the offense; and the 
corroboration shall not be sufficient, if 
it merely shows the commission of the offense 
or the circumstances thereof. 11 
The testimony of State's witness Dennis Hunt 
and Mary Jones is uncorroborated. Thus, since there 
is no other evidence which connects appellant with 
the burglary, the conviction should be set aside. 
Moreover, State's witness, Sheriff Malmberg, testi-
fied that he had no evidence other than the uncorro-
borated testimony of Dennis Hunt and Mary Jones. 
(T 1 23, T l 24) . 
In the case of State v. Laris, 2 P 2d, 243, 
(1931), the Utah Supreme Court set down a test for 
the sufficiency of the corroborated evidence, cit-
ing State v. Cox, 277 P 972; State v. Butterfield, 
261 P 804; State v. Lay, 110 P 986, and State v. 
Spencer, 49 P 302. 
At page 246 the Court said: 
·~ * * the test for sufficiency of the 
corroborated evidence is that it need not 
be sufficient in itself to sustain a con-
viction but it must in and of itself tend 
to implicate and connect the accused with 
the commission of the crime charged, and 
not be consistant with his innocence. It 
is insufficient if it merely casts a grave 
suspicion on the accused.rr 
12 
Also cited with approval in the Laris case ----..:..::.• 
supra, at page 246, is another test suggested in 
Weldon v. State, 10 Tex. App. 400, which reads as 
fol lows: 
"Eliminate from the case the evidence of 
the accomplice and then examine the evidence 
of the other witnesses or witness with the 
view to ascertain if there be inculpatory 
evidence - evidence tending to connect the 
defendant with the offense. If there is, 
the accomplice is corroborated; if there 
is no inculpatory evidence, there is not 
corrobor~tion, though the accomplice may be 
corroborated in regard to any number of facts 
shown to be him. 11 
See also State v. Lay, I JO P 986, where the 
court held that section 77-31-18 precludes convic-
tion of a defendant upon uncorroborated testimony 
of an accomplice even though the jury believes his 
testimony to be true as to every material fact and 
are convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
The court reaffirmed its position of the~ 
case, supra in State v. Lane, 3 U 2d 23, 277 P 2d 
~in holding that no conviction may be had upon 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record of the trial together 
with the applicable Jaw upon the points raised in 
1 3 
this appeal the conviction of the appellant should 
be reversed and the case dismissed, 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALEE, STRATFORD 
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2640 Washington Blvd, 
Ogden, Utah 
